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Supreme Court Review
INCOME TAXATION
M.N.R. v. Sedgwick, [1964] S.C.R. 177.
JAMES BAKE"
INCOME TAX - INCOME OR CAPITAL GAIN - SALE OF PARTNERSHIP
SHARE OR DISSOLUTION
In this case the Supreme Court of Canada decided that the profits
of a partnership which are distributed on dissolution of the partner-
ship are income in the hands of the recipients and therefore taxable.
There is nothing revolutionary about this decision. Both the majority
and dissenting opinions, and the judgment of the Exchequer Court
here appealed from proceed on the same view of the law which may
be stated as follows:
On dissolution of a partnership, after payment of creditors the
profits are handed over to the erstwhile partners and constitute taxable
income in their hands. But upon the mere sale of a share in a partner-
ship, the selling partner is giving up a capital asset consisting in part
of his right to share in the profits (as opposed to his share of them)
and the money he receives is a capital receipt exempt from taxation.
The problem raised by this case is the meaning to be attached
to the categories "mere sale of a share" and "dissolution". Is there
really any difference between a dissolution and the sale of a share, or
between a share of the profits and the right to share in the profits?
The majority judgment does not answer this question and affords
little assistance to the lawyer who wants to predict how the Courts
will classify future fact situations.
The facts of the case were these: Five individuals including the
Respondent entered into an agreement with P under which they agreed
to lend P money to be used as working capital for his brokerage
business and to obtain a seat on the Toronto Stock Exchange. No
interest was payable on the loan but the lenders were to take a share
of the profits. The lenders reserved considerable control over the
operation. A clause in the agreement expressly stipulated that the
relationship between the parties was to be that of debtor and creditors
and was not to be construed as a partnership.
After having obtained a seat on the Exchange the parties were
obliged to terminate their arrangement due to a Stock Exchange rule
forbidding the participation in profits by persons not actively partici-
pating in the brokerage business. Consequently a new agreement
was entered into by the parties under which the borrower, P, bought
out the interests of the lenders. This agreement provided for the
payment of $550,000 to the lenders which was made up of five separate
items. The largest was a $300,000 item designated as the lenders'
share in the profits. The Respondent's share in this sum was $30,000
and the issue was whether he was taxable in respect of it.
*Mr. Blake is a third year student at Osgoode Hall Law School.
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In the Exchequer Court it was decided that the arrangement
between the parties constituted a partnership and this point was not
disputed in the Supreme Court. Section 6(c) of the Income Tax Act
taxes the taxpayer's income from a partnership whether or not he
has withdrawn it. The problem therefore was whether the $30,000
receipt was income from a partnership, which in turn depended upon
whether the transaction was a sale of a share or a dissolution of the
partnership.
The dissenting judgment of Spence J. parallels the reasoning in
the Exchequer Court. First he concludes that what transpired was
not a dissolution:
I am of the opinion that a dissolution of a partnership necessarily implies
a division of the assets of a partnership after payment of the creditors,
amongst the partners in proportion of their respective shares In the
partnership. In the present case there was no attempt at realization of
the partnership assets either by money or in specie between the former
partners . . .
After studying three English cases 2 in detail he decides that:
The recital of the sum of $300,000 as being the fixed share of the creditors
in the net profits of the business for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1956
is merely a recital of how one of the items used to determine the sale
price was arrived at . . such a device ... cannot change the fact that
the actual price calculated and paid was a capital receipt and not a receipt
of income.3
Thus he held that no tax was payable in respect of it.
The majority of the Court disagreed, in a judgment delivered by
Martland J.. The close reasoning and the careful reference to authority
displayed in both the dissent and the Exchequer Court judgment are
disregarded, and Martland J. simply states:
I cannot construe the agreement as one for the sale of the interest In
a partnership. It is rather an agreement for the winding up of the partner-
ship, which had been necessitated by the decision of the Board of Gover-
nors of the Toronto Stock Exchange. As a result of that decision, the
lenders were thereafter precluded from sharing in the profits of the
business. That right they gave up in the agreement because they had been
compelled to do so.4
The Court did not comment on the remarks of Lord Wrenbury
made in the Glenboig case referred to in the dissent:
Is a sum profit which is paid to an owner of property on the terms that
he shall not use his property so as to make a profit? The answer must be
in the negative. The whole point is that he is not to make a profit and Is
paid for abstaining from seeking to make a profit.5
In the result the $300,000 item was characterized as a share in the
profits, the character of which was not altered by being added to the
other items on the list.
1 [1964] S.C.R. 177 at 187.
2 Glenboig Union Fireclay Co. v. C.I.R. [1922] S.C. (H.L.) 112; Rutherford
v. C.I.R. (1926) 10 Tax Cas. 683; Van Den Bergh Ltd. v. Clark [1935] A.C. 431.
3 Supra, footnote 1.
4 Id. at 182.
5 [1922] S.C. (H.L.) 162 at 164.
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No cases are referred to by the majority in support of its con-
clusions. Johnston v. M.N.R. is cited as authority for the proposition
that unless the taxpayer can prove that his income is less than the
amount for which he is assessed he must pay tax on the whole of
it. This begs the question as to what is meant by income and as to
whether any of the $30,000 here in issue is income or not.
It is impossible to say that the case was wrongly decided in view
of the finding that there was a dissolution. But similarly it is impos-
sible to say that the dissent is wrong. The paradox arises from the
absence of any real distinction between the categories into which the
facts are being fitted.
The sale of a share in a partnership is necessarily a dissolution, at
least to the extent that the agency relationship and the profit sharing
arrangement subsisting before such sale is terminated by the sale.
Yet the word 'dissolution' has been used in at least two other senses.
Spence J. in his dissent states that a dissolution of a partnership
"necessarily implies a division of the assets of the partnership after
payment of the creditors among the partners in proportion to their
respective shares". This would suggest that the partnership business
completely comes to an end on a dissolution. But as far back as 18326
it was held that where one partner sells his share to another who
continues the partnership business as a sole proprietorship, a dis-
solution of the partnership has taken place. Thus there is only one
situation where it makes any sense to distinguish between a dissolution
and a sale of a share, and that is where there is no sale at all but
the partners simply close down their operations. In all other situations
the transaction must be both dissolution and sale. Some of the cases7
recognize this and talk in terms of 'the disolution agreement under
which a retiring partner sells his share'. Without a more refined
definition of terms the suggestion that there is a distinction to be
made is unrealistic. While Spence J. spells out the sense in which he
uses the term "dissolution" so as to distinguish it from the "mere sale
of a share", the majority wastes no words on either category which
might conceivably help the taxpayer or his lawyer to differentiate
between them. Martland J. appears to make an unexplained choice
between two labels for the same transaction.
Having chosen between the categories "dissolution" and "sale of
a share in the partnership" the choice between profits and the right to
share in the profits follows. The Courts only use the concept of "the
right to share in profits" when they have found the sale of a share
in a partnership. The distinction between these two categories must
be purely consequential since the sale price of the right to share in
the profits is measured with reference to the actual amount of profits.
Nevertheless, the consequential difference is of the utmost significance.
6 Heath v. Sansom (1832) 4 B. & Ad. 172.
7 e.g. Rutherford v. G.I.P., supra, footnote 2.
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Spence J. quotes Lord Macmillan in the Van den Bergh case:
But even if payment is measured by annual receipts it s not necessarly
itself an item of income. As Lord Buckmaster pointed out in the case of
Glenboig Union Fireclay Co. v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, 1922
S.C. (H.L.) 112, 115. 'There is no relation between the measure that Is
used for the purpose of calculating a particular result and the quality
of the figure that is arrived at by means of that test.'8
The majority may have had sound reasons for deciding that the
$300,000 was profit but the argument to the contrary is not answered.
It is ignored.
The key point of difference between the majority and dissenting
judgments lies in the characterization of the transaction as a dissolu-
tion or the sale of a share in a partnership. All the remaining dif-
ferences flow from that. The sole criticism to be levelled at the
majority is the ipse dixit form of its opinion. No law is cited having
a bearing on the vital matter of characterization, and no comment of
any kind is made on the Respondent's contentions or the authorities
cited in support of them. These authorities are neither criticized nor
distinguished. No notice is taken of them at all. The effect of the
decision is that for reasons best known to the majority judges the
line of reasoning supporting the view of the transaction as the sale
of a share in a partnership is not applicable to the situation where
the 'sale' is not entirely voluntary and one of the partners continues
to carry on the partnership business.
LABOUR LAW
Jarvis v. Associated Medical Services Incorporated [1964] S.C.R. 497.
Ross JUDGE*
LABOUR LAW - CERTIORARI - EFFECT OF PRIVATIVE CLAUSE.
There is a present fear among members of the labour bar in
Ontario that procedure and substantive law in the labour field is,
in the case of the former, becoming too formal and legalistic, and in
the case of the latter, being too greatly influenced by the courts and
their concept of the law. The result is that too little care is being
lavished on the general policy of the Labour Relations Act, the settle-
ment of industrial disputes.
At least three reasons can be presented to explain this state of
affairs. Although lawyers are not by any means exclusively used in
8 Supra, footnote 1 at 190.
*Mr. Judge is a third year student at Osgoode Hall Law School.
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